The Fatal Free Fall Of Air France Flight 447 And Our Takeaways From It

A computer simulation of Air France Flight 447 flying through storm clouds at cruising altitude.

Air France Flight 447 was a scheduled passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, to Paris, France. On June 1, 2009, the Airbus A330 operating the flight crashed into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 people on board. Given the A330’s track record and the level of modern advancements in the aviation industry, the crash of Flight 447 came in as quite a bit of a shock, and it led to major investigations and changes in aviation safety. In this article, we will walk through exactly what had happened that night, what went wrong, and what we learned from the accident.

Background

The aircraft involved was an Airbus A330-203, a wide-body airliner designed for long-haul flights like the one in the incident. It has two engines, a fly-by-wire control system, and advanced navigation equipment. The fly-by-wire system replaces traditional mechanical flight controls with electronic signals. It also includes protections that prevent the plane from exceeding certain flight limits, thus helping the pilots maintain control under normal conditions. However, the system does allow pilots to take manual control in certain situations. An important thing to note about the A330 is that the sidestick, which allows for pitch (nose up/down) and roll (wing tilt to the left/right) inputs, is located to the pilots’ side. As a result, pilots often don't have a direct view of it, and they mostly rely on muscle memory when using it. 

Aboard Flight 447 were three pilots. The captain was Marc Dubois, 58 years old, with more than 11,000 hours of flying experience, including over 6,000 hours on the Airbus A330 alone. Needless to say, he was an experienced pilot with a long career at Air France. The first officer flying at the time of the accident was Pierre-Cédric Bonin, 32 years old, with about 2,900 flight hours, including around 500 hours on the A330. The second first officer was David Robert, 37 years old, with approximately 6,400 hours of flight time and more than 1,800 hours on the A330. When the accident happened, Bonin and Robert were the pilots in the two primary seats of the cockpit.

The Accident

The position of Flight 447 at different times until it disappeared off the radar.

On the night of the accident, Flight 447 was cruising over the Atlantic Ocean at an altitude of 35,000 feet, with reports of thunderstorms and turbulence in the area. When the aircraft entered one of these storms, the pitot tubes, which measure airspeed, froze, causing the autopilot and auto-thrust systems to disconnect automatically. While this on its own may seem like an emergency, frozen pitot tubes aren’t actually that uncommon. In fact, it happens often, and all pilots have to do is turn on the external heating system and wait a minute or two for the pitot tubes to clear up. During this window of time, the pilots must manually control the aircraft, before reengaging the autopilot after the pitot tubes are good to go.

As expected, First Officer Pierre-Cédric Bonin, who was at the controls at the time, began to manually adjust the aircraft’s pitch in response to the sudden disengagement of autopilot. But almost immediately, the nose of the aircraft rose sharply, and the plane’s airspeed began to decrease. Bonin attempted to maintain what he believed was a safe climb, but by pulling back on the sidestick, he inadvertently raised the angle of attack to a level that caused the aircraft to stall. A stall occurs when the wings cannot produce enough lift to keep the plane flying, and in this case, the stall warnings sounded repeatedly for nearly two minutes. When airspeed drops and a plane is at the brink of a stall, it’s standard procedure to push the nose down and pick up some speed. The second first officer David Robert, who was seated at the instruments, issued repeated instructions to Bonin to lower the nose and increase airspeed. In the cockpit voice recorder (CVR), Robert can be heard urgently saying, “Descend… It says we’re going up…It says we’re going up, so descend.” Bonin, however, seemed to have been paralyzed by some sort of shock, and he continued to unknowingly pull back on the sidestick. 

Captain Marc Dubois had been resting in the cabin, and he was soon alerted by Robert of what was going on in the cockpit. Dubois returned to the flight deck within moments to assess the situation immediately, but by then, the aircraft was already in a steep nose-up attitude, and the stall was fully established. At first, Dubois couldn’t figure out what was causing the stall, but when he looked at Bonin’s sidestick, he immediately realized that Bonin was the one causing the stall by pulling up. Dubois attempted to take control and issued commands to correct the angle of attack and regain speed. However, given the plane’s position, combined with the pilots’ previous inputs, made recovery extremely difficult. Meanwhile, the stall warning system continued to sound intermittently. As the plane went down, the CVR captured the last moments, with Robert exclaiming, “Damn it, we’re going to crash. This can’t be happening!”

Post-Crash Investigation

A photo showing one of the landing gears from the underwater wreckage of Flight 447.

An investigation by the French Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA) concluded that multiple factors had combined to create the disaster. First, the freezing of the pitot tubes was the initiating technical failure, removing reliable airspeed information and disconnecting the autopilot. The pilots’ response to the resulting stall, particularly Bonin’s continued nose-up inputs, was the primary human factor. The report also noted that Bonin had fewer than 500 hours on the A330 and limited experience with high-altitude stalls, which behave differently than the low-altitude stalls commonly practiced in simulators. At high altitude, the margin between stall speed and maximum operating speed is narrower, and the aircraft responds more slowly to control inputs, which requires precise speed and angle-of-attack management.

Another factor that the investigators identified was cockpit resource management. Although Bonin and Robert did communicate, the BEA found that their coordination was insufficient under the stress of multiple alarms and unreliable instruments. Each pilot assumed the other understood the situation, and critical instructions were sometimes missed or misinterpreted. Dubois’ arrival brought an experienced perspective, but by the time he returned, the aircraft was already in a position that limited corrective options. The combination of automated system failure, high-altitude aerodynamics, and communication gaps contributed to a delay in effective stall recovery. This is why it’s so important to strike a balance between individual decision-making and teamwork in emergency situations.

The sequence of events in the cockpit shows that the pilots were aware of the emergency but did not recognize the stall condition. The flight data recorders indicate that the stall warnings persisted for nearly two minutes, yet for some reason, the crew, particularly Bonin, chose to focus on climbing and maintaining altitude rather than lowering the nose to regain airspeed. Bonin’s repeated questions, such as, “But what’s happening?” show that he did not understand the aircraft’s condition. Robert, on the other hand, did seem to know that the aircraft was stalling. He warned, “Descend…Gently,” in an attempt to correct the situation, but these commands were not firm and well-communicated. The intermittent stall alarm added ambiguity and contributed to misinterpretation, therefore making it even more difficult for the crew to prioritize recovery actions.

The BEA also emphasized the role of equipment reliability in the accident. Pitot tubes are simple instruments, but they provide critical airspeed data. The older design used on Flight 447 was susceptible to icing, and after the crash, many airlines replaced them with improved versions less likely to freeze. Adding on, pilots are now trained to recognize unreliable airspeed readings and respond appropriately, and aircraft systems have been updated to improve indications and handling when sensors fail. The accident also led to revisions in simulator training, including scenarios of high-altitude stalls and manual control after autopilot disengagement, so pilots can practice these rare but critical events in a safe environment.

Conclusion

Flight 447 demonstrated the interaction between technology, human performance, and operational procedures in modern aviation. Automated systems are designed to make flight safer and reduce workload, but they do fail sometimes. During such times, it’s crucial that the pilots are able to assume manual control immediately and correctly interpret aircraft behavior. High-altitude stalls are pretty uncommon, but they require specific knowledge, and pilots must manage airspeed, angle of attack, and coordinated control inputs precisely. Clear communication between cockpit crew members is important as well, especially in complex situations like in the case of Flight 447, to ensure that all pilots understand the aircraft’s condition and take coordinated action.

Nearly two years after the crash, when the flight recorders were recovered, investigators got the critical data that they needed to reconstruct the sequence of events and understand both technical and human factors. Without this information, the causes of the accident would have remained uncertain, and the lessons learned could not have informed improvements in training, aircraft systems, and operational procedures. Nowadays, pilots are trained to deal with high-altitude stalls, unreliable instrument readings, and sudden automation disengagements, and aircraft systems have been modified to provide clearer guidance in such situations.

Exact CVR Transcript

Below, you can find the CVR transcript released by the BEA. It shows the actual conversation involving First Officers Pierre-Cédric Bonin and David Robert, Captain Marc Dubois, and a flight attendant. All times are in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC). The crew members conversed in French in the original recording. The CVR transcript below is the translated version:

02:03:44 (Bonin): The inter-tropical convergence… look, we’re in it, between ‘Salpu’ and ‘Tasil.’ And then, look, we’re right in it…

02:05:55 (Robert): Yes, let’s call them in the back, to let them know… 

02:05:59 (Flight Attendant): Yes? Marilyn.

02:06:04 (Bonin): Yes, Marilyn, it’s Pierre up front… Listen, in 2 minutes, we’re going to be getting into an area where things are going to be moving around a little bit more than now. You’ll want to take care.

02:06:13 (Flight Attendant): Okay, we should sit down then?

02:06:15 (Bonin): Well, I think that’s not a bad idea. Give your friends a heads-up. 

02:06:18 (Flight Attendant): Yeah, okay, I’ll tell the others in the back. Thanks a lot.

02:06:19 (Bonin): I’ll call you back as soon as we’re out of it.

02:06:20 (Flight Attendant): Okay.

02:06:50 (Bonin): Let’s go for the anti-icing system. It’s better than nothing.

[Pilots turn on the anti-icing system]

02:07:00 (Bonin): We seem to be at the end of the cloud layer, it might be okay.

02:08:03 (Robert): You can possibly pull it a little to the left.

02:08:05 (Bonin): You can possibly pull it a little to the left. We’re agreed that we’re in manual, yeah?

[An alarm sounds for 2.2 seconds and autopilot disconnects]

02:10:06 (Bonin): I have the controls. 

02:10:07 (Robert): Okay.

[Bonin pulls back on his sidestick, and stall warnings sound]

02:10:07 (Robert): What’s this? 

02:10:15 (Bonin): There’s no good… there’s no good speed indication.

02:10:16 (Robert): We’ve lost the, the, the speeds, then?

[The plane is climbing at a rate of 7,000 feet per minute and is moving at just 93 knots]

02:10:27 (Robert): Pay attention to your speed. Pay attention to your speed.

02:10:28 (Bonin): Okay, okay, I’m descending.

02:10:30 (Robert): Stabilize.

02:10:31 (Bonin): Yeah.

02:10:31 (Robert): Descend… It says we’re going up… It says we’re going up, so descend.

02:10:36 (Robert): Descend!

 02:10:37 (Bonin): Here we go, we’re descending.

02:10:38 (Robert): Gently!

02:10:41 (Bonin): We’re… yeah, we’re in a climb.

02:10:49 (Robert): Damn it, where is he?

02:10:55 (Robert): Damn it!

02:11:03 (Bonin): I’m in TOGA, huh?

[TOGA is the maximum throttle setting available for Takeoff/Go Around. In other words, the engines are basically at full power]

02:11:06 (Robert): Damn it, is he coming or not?

02:11:21 (Robert): We still have the engines! What the hell is happening? I don’t understand what’s happening.

[Bonin continues to pull back on the sidestick]

02:11:32 (Bonin): Damn it, I don’t have control of the plane, I don’t have control of the plane at all!

02:11:37 (Robert): Left seat taking control!

[The captain returns to the cockpit]

02:11:43 (Dubois): What the hell are you doing?

02:11:45 (Bonin): We’ve lost control of the plane!

02:11:47 (Robert): We’ve totally lost control of the plane. We don’t understand at all… We’ve tried everything.

[The plane is now falling fast. It is moving forward at a speed of around 100 knots and descending at a rate of 10,000 feet per minute, at an angle of 41.5 degrees]

02:12:14 (Robert): What do you think? What do you think? What should we do?

02:13:40 (Robert): Climb... climb... climb... climb...

02:13:40 (Bonin): But I've had the stick back the whole time!

02:13:42 (Dubois): No, no, no… Don’t climb… no, no.

02:13:43 (Robert): Descend, then… Give me the controls… Give me the controls!

[Bonin yields the controls, and Robert puts the nose down. The plane begins to regain speed. When they reach an altitude of 2,000 feet, the aircraft’s sensors detect the surface and trigger a new alarm. Bonin once again takes back the controls and pulls his sidestick all the way back]

02:14:23 (Robert): Damn it, we’re going to crash… This can’t be happening!

02:14:25 (Bonin): But what’s happening?

02:14:27 (Dubois): Ten degrees of pitch…

[The cockpit voice recorder stops 1.4 seconds later when the plane slams into the Atlantic Ocean]